Earlier this year, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) published a withering critique of the U.S. military's counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. The report generated much media attention because it was written by no less than the top intelligence officer in Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn. Among the provocative statements in his assessment:
Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade.
This alone would be obvious cause for concern. But as Michael Klare points out in this piece, counterinsurgency has become the favored strategy in the wider U.S. war against Al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism. And unlike ...
