I pretty much assumed that the 1990s wars between the "postmodernists" and the scientists were long over. They always seemed to turn as much on disciplinary misunderstandings as on actual differences of position: The allegedly "postmodern" view that so outraged scientists--a starkly relativistic approach which accorded the discoveries of science no greater standing than mythological or faith-based way of seeing the world--was never really held by many people. That's in large part because it's so obviously ludicrous. But now--having just read this review of a new history of science book from Oxford University Press, Patricia Fara's Science: A Four Thousand Year History-- I'm beginning wonder:
Science is an impressive antidote to the idea of scientific endeavour as a straight line of progress. Yet Fara takes it too far by ignoring how the knowledge produced relates to the external world: she treats all theories as equal, regardless of the evidence. For instance, when arguing that doctors rejected the "animal magnetism" therapies of Franz Mesmer in the 19th century because they feared he was stealing their patients, she discounts the lack of a rational explanation for his theories and does not mention that they failed the first ever controlled clinical trial.
A more worrying case is Fara's interpretation of global warming. She argues that the theory arose because selling doomsday scenarios helps researchers to win funding. And putting the blame on humanity also enables scientists to "fulfil the same psychological needs as religious prophets who preached that the end of the world represents God's punishment of the sinful". She does not appear to acknowledge that scientists might be convinced by global warming because it is actually happening.
The book is a valuable reminder that science is inevitably a product of the people who carry it out, and that the way we explain the world cannot be separated from social prejudices and political priorities. This alone, though, does not explain science's success. Science has become so dominant because it works. Medicines do save lives, aeroplanes do fly, nuclear bombs do explode. Ignoring this is misguided, and in some cases downright dangerous.
I see one of two possibilities here. Either Fara really is such a strong relativist, or the book's reviewer is overreacting to certain passages. I can't be sure--I've received the book myself from Oxford, but have not yet cracked it open--but I hope the answer is the latter.
